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1 Introduction
Extensive theoretical and experimental literature regards asymmetric information about the
likely sentence as the main impediment to settlement (Daugherty, 2000). Babcock et al. (1995)
provide experimental evidence that introducing asymmetric information severs bargaining in-
eciencies. Recent ndings suggest that psychological biases might for their part contribute
to the failure to reconcile a deal. Firstly, early theoretical work in this domain highlights the
role of mutually incompatible self-serving beliefs in bringing negotiations to a deadlock (Gould,
1973; Landes 1971; Posner, 1973; Shavell, 1982). Experimental research reviewed in Babcock
and Loewenstein (1997) indeed came to conrm this view. Secondly, psychological biases in risk
attitudes may also bring about negotiation deadlocks. While lawyers have extensively studied
the topic in non-incentivized and framed experiments (Rachlinski, 1996; Guthrie, 2000; Ko-
robkin 2002; Guthrie 2003) it has received little attention among economists, and in addition to
Delrossi and Phillips (1999) few incentivized laboratory studies on the topic exist.
In an attempt to narrow this gap, and building on the work on behavioral law and economics
summarized in Guthrie (2003) or more broadly in Camerer and Talley (2007) and Jolls (2007),
we study the eect of dispersion in trial outcomes on settlement and litigation in a non-framed,
anonymous computerized experiment. In our design, parties rst attempt a settlement through
take-it-or-leave-it oers. A failure to strike a deal gives one party of the negotiations an option
either to acquiesce or to engage in inecient rent-seeking. Settlement negotiations prior to
the plainti's decision to raise a lawsuit constitute a typical application of the setup. To x
ideas, let us therefore proceed with the legal context terminology in what follows while keeping
in mind the wide range of alternative applications. In addition to the typical advantages of
controlled experimentation put forward by numerous authors,1 there is an added advantage of
the adopted methodology in the study of legal disputes. Settled cases are under-represented in
eld data whereas a laboratory experiment fully avoids this selection bias.2 It is particularly
dicult to nd unbiased data with natural independent variation in dispersion of court decrees.
There may prevail dierences in dispersion in adjudications across countries and jurisdictions
but these latter also dier in many other key aspects which also might inuence settlement and
litigation and the selection biases in the data.
Our design excludes asymmetric information and self-serving biases about likely decrees as
explanations for impasse.3 The decision to litigate results in a computerized court ruling with
an exogenous and publicly known probability of winning and losing, and equally large publicly
1See Falk and Heckman (2009), for instance.
2External validity poses a challenge to lab studies and ideally the eld and the lab complement each other in
promoting our understanding of such disputes.
3Naturally there may be incomplete information about individual characteristics such as traits associated with
risk-aversion or other-regarding preference.
2
known expenses to each side of the dispute.4 We experimentally vary (i) the plainti's probability
of winning, (ii) the expenses of going to court, and (iii), while preserving the expected payos
at court, whether the court rulings are risky.
We nd that the litigation rates are higher with aleatory adjudication. Plaintis choose
to litigate more often than not even when doing so is suboptimal. This nding has at least
three non-exclusive explanations (i) illusion of control (Langer, 1975); (ii) loss aversion, and
(iii) overweighting of small probabilities (Tversky and Kahnemann, 1992). Our evidence favors
the second explanation: the plaintis are willing to take negative expected value bets for more
equality.5
Turning interest to the laboratory negotiations preceding the litigation choices, we nd that
settlement rates are highest when it is expensive to appeal. This is in line with the predictions of
traditional theory: higher legal expenses should increase the scope for settlement.6 Indeed, the
comparative statics predictions of the logit-quantal-response equilibrium, a parametric general-
ization of the Nash equilibrium, capture well the treatment eects on the settlement rate in our
data as well as the observed litigation rates. Yet, due to a small twist in our experimental design,
subgame perfect equilibrium fails to pass the hurdle. Thus, our design allows to point out some
limitations of prescriptive rationality assumptions in empirical work which can be circumvented
by the adoption of more empirically driven concepts.
Yet, we also nd that variant decrees induce more disagreement when the plaintis have
scant chances of winning. This nding stands in contrast to the expected utility prediction
that risk-averse subjects should take more precaution in securing a deal when court decrees
are more variant and thus the scope for settlement should be larger. The result cannot be
construed by alternative solution concepts. Contrary to our results, Ashenfelter et al. (1992)
found that (commonly known) more erratic arbitration increases the settlement rate. As Delrossi
and Phillips (1999), they studied eects of forced arbitration if failing to agree. In our setup,
arbitration is costly and an option chosen by the plainti; we can also study the very choice of
pursuing or withdrawing the court case. When legal costs are high, however, our ndings are
in line with those of Ashenfelter et al.: settlement rate is higher when there is more variance in
court rulings.
Delrossi and Phillips (1999) also set up a non-framed incentivized laboratory experiment to
study the eects of risky court rulings on settlement negotiation outcomes and come up with
evidence in line with the reection eect of loss aversion as we do. While Delrossi and Phillips
4Thus our study reects the American rule, see Plott (1987) for an experimental comparison of the English
and American rules of attribution of legal expenses.
5Yet, given the ndings of Linde and Sonnemans (2012), we must must not rush into conclusion that a simple
extension of prospect theory where where loss-gain reference is driven by equal payos would provide a satisfactory
model of social risk taking.
6See Hay and Spier (1998), for instance.
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focused on the interaction between asymmetric information and risky court outcomes, our in-
terest lies in the interaction between risk attitudes and other-regarding concerns. The present
paper also provides novel design features - independent variation in court rulings and control
for the costliness of court outcomes - which allow sharper identication of the pure eect of risk
and the interaction eect of interest. Linde and Sonnemans (2012) run an experimental study
studying how other-regarding and risk preferences interact. Unlike us, they observe patterns in
line with risk aversion when choosing between lotteries where one's payo falls short of that of
the opponent. Their focus in this loss domain is on a particular class of lotteries where only
the payo of the decision maker depends on the lottery outcomes while there is no variation
in the opponent's payo. Thus there is no option of choosing lotteries which are both costly
punishments and gambles for more equality at the same time, a feature which may be essential
for litigation choices after a failed settlement outcome.
The paper is structured as follows. In the follow-up section, we lay out the model and the
experimental setup. In Section 3 the empirical results regarding litigation behavior are studied
while Section 4 resumes the behavioral patterns in settlement negotiations. We draw conclusions
in Section 5.
2 Experimental design and Theoretical background
2.1 Framework
In this section we present a stylized model of settlement negotiations and litigation. There
are two players: the plainti (P), and the defendant (D). The players engage in commercial
negotiations over a sharing of value X, which is common to both parties. In the experiment, we
set X = 200. If negotiations break, the plainti will have a possibility to sue the defendant to
claim a share of X. The model treats the implications of a won court case on the defendant as
a "court-imposed prot-share". As an example, the plainti assumes the role of a patent holder
and the defendant is an alleged infringer of the patent rights, and the court imposed prot share
corresponds to damages paid to the plainti by the defendant. If P wins the court case, he
receives a total of rX of damages where r 2 (0; 1) is the court-imposed prot-share, set equal
to 2=5 in the experiment. The probability that P wins the court case is p: In the experiment we
consider two alternative values, p = 0:7 and p = 0:1 where the latter condition is coined as the
low chance for P's victory. Litigation is costly as both parties incur legal costs L: We assume
that both parties pay their own costs of trial irrespective of the court outcome (i.e. American
legal system). There are two alternative legal cost conditions in the experiment L = 10 and
L = 58 where the latter holds in the so called high cost of litigation condition (see Table 1).
If the parties reach an ex ante agreement (prior to litigation), they share the value X in
corresponding shares. Let us denote P's share in such an agreement by s (so that P gets sX)
and D's share by (1  s)X: If the parties fail to reach an ex ante agreement, then P chooses
4
whether to litigate or not.
If P decides to litigate, then her expected return is
prX + Y   L; (1)
and the expected return for D is
(1  pr)X   L: (2)
Not litigating yields Y for P while D gets X. We have three cases in focus: benchmark
condition (p = 0:7; L = 10), low chance condition (p = 0:1; L = 10), and high legal costs
condition (p = 0:7; L = 58). The parameters are chosen so that the expected payo for the
plainti coincides in the latter two conditions. The plainti's winning probability was public
information to all subjects.
We endow P with a small additional payment Y = 10, which he gets only in the case where
no ex ante agreement is reached. In our design, Y is there to slightly perturb the balance to
point out some limits of sequential rationality and subgame perfection in empirical work (as will
be explained shortly).
In the experiment, for the sake of tractability, negotiations take a specic and simple form
where each party makes a take-it-or-leave-it oer to the other and one of the proposals is
randomly drawn as the actual proposal, each with probability 50%. In this special case of
random-proposer ultimatum bargaining, actually one of the parties has all bargaining power
in sketching a proposal and the other party is only granted a right to veto it. This extreme
experimental variation in bargaining power is also exploited in the design of Delrossi and Phillips
(1999) but not within a match but across sessions/treatments. Asking for each party to contrive
a proposal for one contingency and a minimal acceptable oer (MAO) for the other within a
match allows us to collect more informative negotiation plans in a concise and simple manner.
The structure and the payos of the bargaining game are illustrated in Figure 1 below.
2.2 Experimental setup
The computerized experiment was conducted in the laboratory of the Max Planck Institute
of Economics in Jena in May 2008, February 2010, and August 2010. Participants were 316
undergraduates from the University of Jena7, randomly drawn from dierent elds of study.
Participants were recruited using the ORSEE software (Greiner, 2004) and the experiment was
programmed with the z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007).
7In Table 4 we report a regression where we include additional observations from 64 individuals who took part
to a treatments where pretrial negotiations were entirely excluded. The plaintis thus made 8 litigation choices in
three dierent experimental conditions and the defendants attempted to guess the choices made by the plaintis
in each of the 8 periods.
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Figure 1: Game Tree.
At the beginning of each session, participants were seated at visually isolated computer ter-
minals where they received a hardcopy of the German instructions.8 Subsequently, participants
would answer a control questionnaire to ensure their understanding (screenshots of control ques-
tions in the appendix). The experiment started after all participants had successfully completed
the questionnaire.9 At the beginning of each session, each subject was assigned one of the two
roles, the plainti (P) or the defendant (D). These roles correspond to the roles in the setup
explained in Section 2.1.
8Instructions, screenshots and further documentation available upon request.
9If a participant could not answer a control question, we did not allow her to proceed to the actual experiment
until understanding was ensured. By raising a hand, a subject could ask a laboratory operator to come to her
cabin and the subject could pose further questions to the operator individually. About 5% of the subjects posed
further questions regarding the instructions. The questions helped to clarify the problems in understanding and
eventually none of the subjects were excluded from the experiment.
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Each experimental session lasted for 8 rounds10, and the outcome of one round was randomly
drawn for the actual payment. Each round consisted of the game described in Figure 1. We used
the strategy vector method in eliciting the choices so that each negotiator chose their proposal
and the MAO without knowing whether the randomly drawn proposer is the defendant or the
plainti. The plainti chose whether to litigate or not without knowing whether an agreement
will be reached at the negotiation stage.11 The opponent's choices (but not the random draws
of nature) were revealed at the end of each repetition of the game. One ECU (experimental
currency unit) corresponds to 0.03 euros. Each plainti could make losses in any given round
including the round randomly drawn for payment. The incurred losses were subtracted of the
show-up fee of 3.5 euros which was announced in the opening paragraph of the experimental
instructions. Thus the aggregate payment to a subject was never negative. The average earnings
were 11.50 euros. The average duration of a session was 1 hour and 20 minutes.
Once the negotiation and litigation choices were elicited, we asked each subject to guess the
choices made by the agent on the opposing side. These guesses were incentivized. Each correct
guess yielded a supplementary payo of 11 ECU. A payo of 1 ECU was subtracted for each unit
(ECU) by which the subject misguessed the actual negotiation choice so that missing the actual
choice (proposal or acceptance threshold) by 10 units delivered 1 ECU and missing by a larger
margin than that gave no supplementary payo at all. To incentivize the binary litigation choice,
we used the proper scoring rule which we discretized to simplify exposition.12 Each defendant
could thus pick one of the following ve guesses: that the plainti surely litigates (refrains from
litigating), that the plainti is more likely to litigate (to refrain from litigating), that litigation
and refraining from it are equally likely. In the end of the experiment, one of the guesses was
randomly drawn for payment from each round but for the round whose negotiation and litigation
choices were paid for. Once beliefs were elicited the actual strategy of the opponent was revealed
to the subject and she was also reminded of her own strategy. Thus the participants did not
learn any population statistics about litigation or negotiation choices nor the outcome of the
random outcome of the court ruling between two periods of interaction. This left room for
learning only from private experiences. The experiment then proceeded to the following round
where each participant was matched with a new subject in the opposing role (perfect strangers)
thus removing any repeated game or reputation incentives.
We considered a deterministic and a stochastic court. The deterministic court diers from
the stochastic only in that the former implements the expected litigation payos of the two
10In one session, there were just 7 rounds due to absence of invited subjects. We dropped one round of play in
the benchmark condition in that session.
11To keep the design simple and not to overburden the subjects, we chose not to condition the litigation choice
on who was assigned the proposer (responder) role in the negotiation stage.
12The proper scoring rule is widely used in economic experiments. See Nyarko and Schotter (2002) for an
exposition how proper scoring rule can be used in belief elicitation in an economic experiment.
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parties with certainty whereas the stochastic court truly implements a random draw using the
publicly known probability of winning for the plainti (the complementary probability is the
winning probability of the defendant). The litigation payos are given in Table 1 above.
There were 12 treatments each consisting of three blocks of 2 (benchmark condition) or 3
(low chance and high cost conditions) rounds and of 16 participants playing in a xed role, once
against each of the participants in the opposing role. While in each block the probability of
winning and the cost of litigation were xed, there was variation in these parameters across the
blocks as specied in Table 1 below.
r = 0:4; Benchmark High cost Low chance
Y = 10 p = 0:7 L = 10 p = 0:7 L = 58 p = 0:1 L = 10
risky court
(P win, p) plain = 80; def = 110 plain = 32; def = 62 plain = 80; def = 110
(D win, 1-p) plain = 0; def = 190 plain =  48; def = 142 plain = 0; def = 190
certain court plain = 56; def = 134 plain = 8; def = 86 plain = 8; def = 182
Table 1: Litigation payoffs across conditions.
Having one treatment for each potential order of the three blocks while having alternatively
either stochastic or deterministic court, xed for the entire 8 rounds of a treatment, yields 12
treatments of that were run in May 2008. In February 2010 we ran some additional sessions
with blocks starting either with the high cost block or the low chance block. In August 2010 we
ran special sessions the design of which is explained in Section 3 and the data of which is only
included in the regressions of Table 4.
2.3 Theoretical predictions
Sequential rationality suggests that the proposed and vetoed shares should depend on the ex-
pected litigation stage payos. The lowest oer the opponent is willing to accept makes her
(almost) indierent between accepting and vetoing it. For a risk-neutral negotiator, it is the
share which coincides with her expected payo from the game ensuing to the litigation stage.13
Sequentially rational negotiation parties should foresee that litigation undermines the mutual
gains from trade and strike an agreement at terms which ensure that rejecting and litigating is
suboptimal.
To secure a deal, P must be oered more than her conict payo which equals (1) or Y
depending on whether it is optimal to litigate or not. Not litigating yields Y for P while D gets
X.
As mentioned above, Y is there to slightly perturb the balance to point out some limits of
13Notice that even a risk-averse opponent would accept this oer which is clearly greater than the certainty
equivalent of the litigation lottery.
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sequential rationality and subgame perfection in empirical work. This additional payo seems
negligibly small relative to the stakes of negotiation to induce any dramatic eects on behavior
and it has no impact on the optimality of litigation itself. Yet, theoretically the impact is drastic:
conict becomes the only the rational solution (subgame perfect equilibrium) of the game in the
high-cost and low chance conditions.
The introduction of Y has a further benet: litigation in the high-cost and low chance
conditions is our core interest and thus Y has, ex-ante, the desirable eect of inducing marginally
more conict and thus making litigation choices to bear more impact.
In the benchmark condition, the plainti's probability of winning is so high and the cost of
litigating so low that the optimal (highest expected monetary return) choice calls for litigation
by the P. His expected return from litigation (1) exceeds the payo from not litigating (the en-
dowment Y ). In the negotiations stage, a self-interested sequentially rational P should therefore
accept all oers weakly greater than his expected return from litigation.
To the contrary, in the low chance of winning case, P's probability of winning is so low that
it is suboptimal to litigate. On the other hand, in the high cost of litigation case, the cost is so
high that it is again suboptimal to litigate. Recall that the expected return from litigation to
P, (1), is equal in the low chance and in the high cost conditions. Thus in the high cost and low
chance conditions a rational P should accept all oers exceeding the endowment Y .
In fact in the high-cost and the low chance conditions the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium
between risk-neutral self-interested parties predicts conict: the defendant should never propose
a positive amount or accept anything less than 200 since she expects to receive 200 in case
of conict knowing that a rational plainti never litigates. Similarly the plainti should not
propose more than 190 or accept less than 10 since she will receive 10 in case of conict. Thus
subgame perfect equilibrium with self-interest somewhat counter-intuitively predicts that cases
never settle and plaintis never litigate in the high cost and low chance conditions while cases
will always settle and plaintis always litigate in the benchmark condition.
PREDICTION 1 The subgame perfect equilibrium with risk-neutral self-interest makes the
following predictions: (1) the plainti litigates in the benchmark condition and does not litigate
in the high cost and low chance conditions. (2) The disagreement rate is 0% in the benchmark
condition and 100% in the high cost and low chance conditions.
While providing a useful benchmarking role for understanding behavior, the subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium turns out too precise and extreme for providing the best t. Actual behavior
always includes noise and decision makers tend to expect this. When plaintis tremble in the
litigation decisions, the noise has a much more drastic impact on the defendants' incentives in
the negotiation table than it has on the plaintis' incentives: the defendant's expected conict
payo falls from 200 to 86 when the plainti shifts from not litigating to litigating and the costs
are high, the plainti's expected payo falls from 10 to 8. Therefore, the defendants should
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react much more to the introduction of trembles making them more cautious and willing to
avoid impasse. This argument can be incorporated using the notion of (agent) logit quantal
response equilibrium (Kelvey and Palfrey, 1998). In the logit-QRE the choice probabilities
reect rationality in the sense that they are inversely related to the opportunity costs of the
choices and the implied choice probabilities are correctly anticipated by the opponents. This
relatively small departure from perfect rationality allows us to drastically improve the settlement
and litigation rate predictions. This general idea has proved successful in a number of other
strategic interaction situations (see Goeree and Holt, 2001, for a particularly illustrative account)
but to our knowledge, we are the rst to apply it to settlement negotiations.
In the logit quantal-response model, the choice probabilities are proportional to the exponen-
tials of the expected payos of the actions given the beliefs on the opponents' behavior. That is,
given expectations of i about the action prole, a i, of other players, i i(a i), player i chooses
action ai with probability
i(ai) =
exp(1=(
P
a i 
i
 i(a i)i(ai; a i))P
a exp(1=(
P
a i 
i
 i(a i)i(a; a i)
(3)
Taking the ratio of choice probabilities of two dierent actions a0i and a
0
i yields merely
i(a
0
i)
i(a00i )
=
exp(1=
P
a i 
i
 i(a i)i(a
0
i; a i))
exp(1=
P
a i 
i
 i(a i)i(a
00
i ; a i)
; (4)
and thus the ratio of choice probabilities is proportional to the ratio of exponentials of expected
payos. In equilibrium expectations and choice probabilities must coincide and thus ji = i
for j 6= i. The novel feature is noise which is increasing in . As  tends to zero, the choice
probabilities converge to a Nash equilibrium of the game.
For our settlement negotiation game, it is crucial to note that when litigation is suboptimal
due to high legal costs, the opportunity cost of litigating is 2 for the plainti while it is 114
for the defendant. Equations (3) and (4) imply that letting  tend towards zero and thus
making parties more rational in their choices, the defendant tends to shy away from suboptimal
negotiation strategies much faster than the plainti abandons litigation. Due to his opponent's
trembling litigation hand, the defendant can drastically raise the settlement rate and reduce
litigation by increasing the plainti's opportunity cost of settlement, i.e. by giving marginally
more to the litigant. Thus for instance with  = 13, in the logit quantal-response equilibrium
the defendant is about 3.6 times more likely to propose 10 to the plainti than 0, and yet the
latter is part of the unique subgame perfect equilibrium path in our setup. The litigation rate
conditional on impasse is about 46% in both cases but by increasing the plainti's share in the
settlement agreement from 0 to 10, the defendant can increase the settlement probability from
about 1/3 to about 1/2.
We show in Section 4 that by introducing the logit-quantal-response equilibrium and the
associated plausible noise structure into the notion of equilibrium, we can better account for
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the behavioral patterns without sacricing too much on the decision makers' rational striving
for their best interest (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1998). We will estimate the noise parameter
in Section 4 where it will turn out that the maximum likelyhood estimate is  = 55. The
corresponding predicted litigation and disagreement rates are listed in the prediction below.
PREDICTION 2 The logit quantal-response equilibrium with risk-neutral self-interest and
 = 55 makes the following predictions: (1) the plainti litigation rate is 71% in the benchmark
condition and 49% in the high cost and low chance conditions. (2) The disagreement rate is 62%
in the benchmark condition while it is 55% and 61% in the high cost and low chance conditions,
respectively.
3 Litigation
3.1 Plainti's litigation choices
Benchmark High cost Low chance Total
p = 0:7 L = 10 p = 0:7 L = 58 p = 0:1 L = 10
RISKY 89% 73% 64% 73%
(early periods) (87%) (72%) (58%) (68%)
CERTAIN 83% 48 % 48% 56%
(early periods) (91%) (48%) (39%) (51%)
TOTAL 86% 60% 57% 65%
(early periods) (89%) (61%) (48%) (59%)
Table 2: Litigation rates pooled over all rounds (in brackets: first two rounds).
The litigation rates across the various treatment conditions are given in Table 2. There
are more appeals to court when the legal costs are low and the probability of winning is high
(p = 0:7 and L = 10) than when these parameters are less propitious to litigation (p = 0:1 or
L = 58). These patterns are in line with the comparative statics predictions of self-interested
rationality. Yet, our data exhibits an abundance of choices not maximizing expected monetary
return. With low costs and high probability of winning, 14% of the subjects do not litigate
although they should. With prohibitively high costs, still 60% of the subjects appeal to court
while 57% of the subjects litigate when chances of winning are suboptimally low. As illustrated
in Section 2, these patterns can be fairly well accommodated within the logit-quantal-response
equilibrium framework.
In Table 3, a dummy variable indicating whether the plaint chose to litigate (1) or not (0) is
regressed on treatment variables HIGH (high cost), LOW (low chance), and RISK (risky courts)
and their interactions controlling for the period of interaction. The benchline condition in this
regression is our benchmark condition (p = 0:7, L = 10) with certain court rulings. This closer
regression analysis shows that there is more litigation in later periods (statistically signicant
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positive eect of the Period -variable) even in conditions where the plainti should refrain from
litigation (the interaction terms HIGH  Period and LOW  Period are insignicant or positive
in regressions (5) and (6) in Table 3).14 The high frequency of litigation when it is not optimal
is striking, underlining the behavioral biases that aect the plainti's choices.
LITIGATION (1) logit (2) logit (3) GLS (4) logit (5) logit (6) GLS
RISK 0.961*** 0.530 0.205*** 0.296 0.526 0.0602
(0.201) (0.366) (0.0491) (0.457) (0.363) (0.0421)
HIGH -1.472*** -1.811*** -0.155*** -1.831*** -1.982*** -0.360***
(0.212) (0.283) (0.0311) (0.281) (0.569) (0.0956)
RISK  HIGH 0.834** 0.168** 0.881** 0.827** 0.255***
(0.411) (0.0681) (0.411) (0.410) (0.0655)
LOW -1.685*** -1.718*** -0.271*** -1.748*** -2.457*** -0.413***
(0.219) (0.281) (0.0535) (0.280) (0.531) (0.0846)
RISK  LOW 0.178 0.0265 0.245 0.202 0.113
(0.422) (0.0723) (0.426) (0.422) (0.0695)
Period 0.105*** 0.105*** 0.0220*** 0.0854** 0.0252 0.0184*
(0.029) (0.029) (0.006) (0.0354) (0.0712) (0.00982)
RISK  Period 0.0443
(0.0584)
LOW  Period 0.157* .0121
(0.0906) (0.015)
HIGH  Period 0.0189 -0.00603
(0.0946) (0.0160)
Constant 0.892*** 1.049*** 0.580*** 1.157*** 1.487*** 0.731***
(0.236) (0.275) (0.0508) (0.288) (0.467) (0.0648)
Observations 1,506
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3: Litigation regressions, main treatment effects
A more puzzling nding is that there is more litigation in the conditions with uncertain trial
outcomes (variable RISK in Table 3 and three top panels of Table 2) than in the respective
conditions which grant the corresponding expected payos for sure (bottom panels). This is
particularly true for the high cost condition (variable RISK  HIGH in Table 3).
RESULT 1 Litigation rate is higher when court is risky, especially when costs are high.
This nding is surprising at rst sight. Most theoretical analysis of settlement would assume
that agents are risk-averse or risk neutral and thus predict that litigation rate is lower when
14Notice that the incentive to keep up a reputation for being tough on litigation cannot account for this eect
since there is no information feed-back about the opponent's choices in previous rounds and in each round each
participant is matched with a new opponent. This is the so called perfect strangers design.
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trial outcomes are more variant.15 The above result yet alleges that the majority of plaintis,
at least, are not risk averse but risk loving.
Three overlapping accounts of this puzzling result suggest themselves. First, people tend to
hold illusions of controlling entirely aleatory events and being able to turn them in their favor.
This is the conclusion of Langer's (1975) intriguing series of experiments - a conclusion which
also has been conrmed in a number of follow up studies. The plaintis' such illusions in the
random court condition may have strengthened the plainti's faith in getting a favorable court
ruling. Thompson et al. (1998) even remark, reviewing the accumulated evidence, that contexts
where favorable and non-favorable outcomes are salient are particularly likely to conceive illusion
of control. The salient monetary payos associated with winning and losing in our setup t well
this description. Naturally, to keep check of the illusion, our instructions explicitly emphasized
that the outcome draw is a fully computerized random draw. Yet, the literature tells us that
the phenomenon stands rm even when odds for winning are explicitly given (Thompson et al.
1998, pp. 147).
Let us consider a second explanation: the prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979;
Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). The literature evinces many cases where risk-loving choice
patterns can be attributed to decision makers' perception of facing a prospect of making losses
and being willing to take negative expected value bets on reducing those losses. Why then,
in our experiment, would the plaintis position themselves to a loss frame when litigating?
Loewenstein et al. (1989) studied the interplay of risk and other-regarding preference in a
hypothetical choice experiment, where subjects self-report their satisfaction with the two parties'
monetary outcomes, and found that disadvantageous inequality16 can be accounted as a loss in
the prospect theory sense. If disadvantageous inequality is perceived as a loss in this manner,
then the disadvantaged plaintis will litigate more the riskier the court rulings. The implications
for settlement patterns could be dramatic: riskiness of court outcomes could increase inecient
litigation, not to reduce it as suggested by risk aversion. 17
A third explanation for the high litigation rate with risky courts also relates to Kahnemann
and Tversky's prospect theory which holds that small-probability events are overweighted in
human estimation of the likelihood of uncertain events. Thus in our experimental condition
where the winning probability is low, 10 %, the winning event might receive a higher weight in
subjects' minds making the prospect of litigation look overly favorable. Guthrie (2000) building
on the work of Rachlinski (1996) discusses in depth the interplay of overweighting and loss
aversion in litigation contexts. He extends Rachlinski's experimental analysis to contexts of
15Prescriptive rational settlement negotiation theory advocates that greater riskiness in court decisions would
induce more precaution. For a review, see Hay and Spier (1998), for instance.
16See also Fehr and Schmidt, 1999.
17In addition to social comparison, high loss references may be driven by high aspirations set at the negotiation
table (Korobkin, 2002), for instance.
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hypothetical frivolous litigation where the chances of winning (or losing) are small but paid
damages are substantial: in line with the prediction of prospect theory, the small probability
contexts reverse the risky choice patterns implied by mere loss aversion so that choices appear
risk-loving (risk-averse) in the gains domain (loss domain) when probability of winning (losing)
is small.
Let us discuss how evidence ts each of these explanations in turn. First considering the
third explanation, the low winning probability should be overweighted when evaluating the
lottery. The winning-outcome in the aleatory condition with low winning probability, p = 0:1
and L = 10, may thus yield a disproportionate weight and this should increase the likelihood
of litigation. The same eect should be absent or weaker in the high cost condition, p = 0:7
and L = 58, since the chances of winning and losing are more equal. In fact the probability of
losing is smaller than that of winning and should thus be given a disproportionate weight if any.
In conclusion, probability overweighting predicts a negative interaction eect between riskiness
and costliness of court rulings when comparing the high cost condition against the low chance
condition (where the expected monetary payos for the plainti are the same) excluding data
from the benchmark condition.18 Since we nd a positive association between risk and expenses
at court, our data rejects probability overweighting as an explanation for the higher litigation
rate under risky courts.
As for the rst explanation, illusion of control also suggests that there should be more litiga-
tion when courts are aleatory: only when court outcomes are random can subjects hold illusion
of controlling the draw. But it does not predict a discriminatory eect between the low chance
and high cost conditions, or if it does it predicts a stronger eect in the low chance condition
where the gains are more vivid than in the high cost condition.19 Thus we can also rule out
illusion of control as an explanation for our litigation patterns.
The second explanation, loss aversion in social comparison, predicts a positive interaction
eect of risk and legal costs on litigation. Let us elaborate the argument in more detail. When
court outcomes are certain, each side of the dispute is allocated her expected payo in the
corresponding random court condition for sure. The (expected) payo of 8 ECU to the plainti
is identical in the high cost and low chance conditions.20 The conditions dier in how much the
court ruling allocates to the defendant (in expected terms): 182 in the low chance condition and
86 in the high cost condition. The expected payo for the plainti being smaller than 10 which
the plainti guarantees by not litigating, a rational plainti only interested in maximizing her
payo would never litigate. Yet, the intrinsic other-regarding preference theories suggest that
the plainti might prefer litigating in order to render payos more equal, especially when such
18Notice yet, that our setup does not allow us to rule out that frivolous litigation would not matter in contexts
where the probability of winning is smaller than 10%.
19Alloy and Abramson (1979) or Dunn and Wilson (1990) for the vividness argument in illusion of control.
20See the section on experimental setup and Table 1.
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equalizing punishment is eective21 as in our high cost condition.
When court rulings are stochastic, they only have an eect on the expected equity of payos.
While there is a chance that payos are much more equal than when outcomes are certain (70%
chance of yielding 32 for the plainti and 62 for the defendant in the high cost scenario; 10%
chance of 70 for the plainti and 110 for the defendant in the low chance scenario) there is also a
chance of losing big time (in the high cost scenario a 30%-chance of losing 48 while the defendant
wins 142; in the low probability scenario a 90%-chance of getting nothing while the defendant
receives 190). Yet, prospect theory holds that a plainti experiencing her payo disadvantage
as a loss is willing to take negative expected value bets on reducing inequality, in line with our
nding that there is more litigation under risky court.
This prediction runs counter to the ndings of Bolton et al. (2005) whose experimental data
illustrate that although expected equality also matters for people, it is less inuential than when
equality can be generated with certainty. 22 Also if people tend to be risk averse (see Holt and
Laury, 2002, for instance), one would expect that the litigation rate is lower when court rulings
are stochastic. We nd the exact opposite: there is more litigation in the conditions where trial
outcomes are stochastic.
RESULT 2 The data supports loss aversion with social comparison as an explanation for
the high litigation rate in risky high-cost condition. Illusion of control and overweighting of
probability are rejected as explanations for the higher litigation rate when courts are risky.
We ran additional sessions where only litigation decisions were made and there were no
pretrial negotiations. We did this in order to exclude any spillover eects of negotiation choices
on litigation choices. In Table 4, we report the results of a logit and a linear panel regression
clustering the standard errors of each individual subject. The comparison in the regression
is between the high cost condition and the low winning probability condition where expected
payos for the litigant are identical (thus benchmark condition data, L = 10 and p = 0:7, are
excluded). The litigation choice is regressed on treatment variables (excluding the benchmark
condition) where the pretrial dummy-variable takes value zero for the additional sessions without
negotiations.
When court rulings are aleatory, the litigation rates in the high cost and the low chance
conditions fall drastically apart unlike in the deterministic case. The fact that litigation rates
21See Camerer (2003), for instance.
22They study subjects in simplied ultimatum games where the pie can only be shared in two asymmetric ways:
80% for proposer and 20% for responder or 20% for proposer and 80% for responder. They found that subjects
were more willing to reject proposals favoring the proposer if the proposer had an alternative option to propose
a lottery over the same unequal outcomes but with equal expected payos. The responder could decide whether
to reject or accept that lottery without knowing its realization. Rejection led to zero payos for each side with
certainty. Yet, the rejection rate of the proposal favorable to the proposer was even higher when there was a sure
fty-fty split alternative available.
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(1) (2)
LITIGATION Logit GLS
RISK 1.048* 0.303**
(0.632) (0.119)
HIGH -.710 -0.0573
(0.620) (0.0903)
RISK  HIGH 1.901** 0.336**
(0.838) (0.148)
Pretrial 0.889* 0.296***
(0.530) (0.0777)
RISK  Pretrial -0.380 -0.152
(0.689) (0.136)
HIGH  Pretrial 0.714 0.0490
(0.636) (0.0977)
RISK  HIGH  Pretrial -1.472 -0.227
(0.899) (0.165)
Period 0.105*** 0.0207***
(0.0337) (0.00741)
Constant -1.424*** 0.103
(0.499) (0.0712)
Observations 1,140 1,134
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p< 0:01, ** p< 0:05, * p< 0:1
Table 4: Litigation regressions, comparision of low chance and high cost treat-
ments
dier signicantly when trial outcomes are risky but not when they are certain in the high cost
case, clearly advocates that there is an interaction eect between other-regarding and risk atti-
tudes. The positive interaction eect speaks in favor of the second explanation: disadvantageous
inequality is perceived as a loss and high costs generate more equal payos thus inducing loss
averse subjects to take the negative expected return bet in the hope of substantially reducing
the inequality.
There are some further results of interest. First, litigation tends to be more prevalent when
done in the context with pretrial negotiations (the positive coecient of the pretrial variable).
This may reect negative reciprocation of failures to agree which are attributed to the opponent
(see Cox et al., 2007 and the references therein, for instance). Ho and Liu (2011) conduct an
intriguing empirical study on how apologies can help to reduce anger related to attribution of
negative outcomes to physicians and thus reduce litigation rates by patients in medical malprac-
tice cases. Second, there also tends to be more litigation at the later periods, which is surprising
since litigation is suboptimal according to self-interested rationality in all the conditions included
in these regressions, and a standard learning argument would thus suggest less litigation in later
periods.
RESULT 3 & 4 Litigation is more prevalent in sessions with pretrial negotiations than
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without. There is more litigation in later periods.
3.2 Expectations about litigation
For the sake of understanding conict in strategic interaction, it is crucial to understand to which
extent parties have correct expectations about each other's choices. Incorrect expectations are
likely to induce miscoordination and amplify conict (Babcock and Lowenstein, 1997). Table
5 below studies the extent to which defendants expect litigation across treatment conditions to
dier and how expectations are adjusted from one period to another. In the rst four regressions
we use linear panel regression clustering individual standard errors. The fth regression is a
corresponding ordered logit-regression.
Guess Litigation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GLS GLS GLS GLS ord.logit
RISK 0.325*** 0.0355 -0.188 -0.156 -0.729**
(0.111) (0.272) (0.322) (0.188) (0.355)
Period -0.0104 -0.0576** -0.0634** -0.0337 -0.107***
(0.0182) (0.0271) (0.0247) (0.0310) (0.041)
RISKPeriod 0.0803** 0.0981*** 0.0779*** 0.180***
(0.0375) (0.0363) (0.0294) (0.056)
HIGH -0.624*** -0.527*** -0.884*** -0.606** -1.375***
(0.0974) (0.116) (0.167) (0.241) (0.254)
HIGHRISK 0.522** 0.366* 0.788**
(0.206) (0.188) (0.313)
HIGHPeriod -0.0445
(0.0416)
LOW -0.561*** -0.434*** -0.658*** -0.619** -1.005***
(0.108) (0.118) (0.189) (0.249) (0.277)
LOWRISK 0.184 0.0191 0.293
(0.240) (0.213) (0.345)
LOWPeriod 0.0122
(0.0423)
Constant 3.683*** 3.660*** 3.886*** 3.845*** -
(0.122) (0.208) (0.214) (0.182) -
Observations 1,250 1,250 1,250 1,250
Number of id 158 158 158 158
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 5: Beliefs on litigation
The defendants have fairly correct expectations about the signs of treatment eects and they
even correctly expect more litigation in the aleatory high cost case than in the corresponding
deterministic condition (signicant positive coecient of HIGH  RISK in regressions (3) and
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(4)).23 Misguided expectations about the litigation rates can thus fairly reliably be excluded as
an explanation of conict at the negotiation stage, the issue to be studied in further detail in
the follow-up section.
RESULT 5 The plaintis expectations about the litigation rate are not erroneous.
4 Negotiations
Let us now turn our interest to how settlements are reconciled or how disagreement arises.
Table 6 below reports the disagreement rates in our six dierent experimental conditions.24 It
Benchmark High cost Low chance Total
p = 0:7 L = 10 p = 0:7 L = 58 p = 0:1 L = 10
risky court 51% 38% 47% 45%
(early periods) (57%) (42%) (63%) (53%)
certain court 55% 37% 50% 46%
(early periods) (48%) (41%) (39%) (41%)
Total 53% 37% 49% 45%
(early) (52%) (41%) (50%) (47%)
logit-QRE with  = 55 62% 55% 61% -
Perfect Nash 0% 100% 100% -
Table 6: Disagreement rates and theoretical predictions, pooled over all rounds
(in brackets: first two rounds).
is straightforward to notice that subgame perfect Nash equilibrium fails to account for these
patterns. As explained in Section 2, the subgame perfect equilibrium disagreement rate is 0% in
the benchmark condition where litigation is optimal and 100% in the high cost and low chance
conditions where no litigation should occur. We do not observe such extreme disagreement
rates and moreover even the empirical comparative statics are against the subgame perfect
equilibrium prediction: there is more disagreement in the benchmark condition than in the high
cost condition and not vice versa as predicted by subgame perfection.
The logit-QRE makes better predictions and even captures the comparative statics between
benchmark, high cost, and low chance conditions. Remarkably, the logit-QRE correctly predicts
that settlement rate is approximately equal in the low chance and the benchmark condition
while the settlement rate in the high cost condition is higher.
We employ maximum likelihood estimation to yield an estimate for  (See Section 2.3).
We rst classify oers (responses) into 21 coarse classes rounding oers 0-9 to 0 (responses
23Of course these comparisons tell us little about whether defendants have correct point estimates about the
average litigation rate.
24Recall that there are eight games played, each time against a dierent opponent and with private feed-back
to rule out dynamic reputation and punishment incentives.
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= minimum acceptaple oers = MAOs 1-10 to 10), oers 10-19 to 10 (MAOs 11-20 to 20)
and so forth so that oers labeled as k are all compatible with MAOs labelled as k and use
this coarsened empirical distribution of oers and responses to calculate the log-likelihood of
the prole of choices given the value of parameter .25 The corresponding choice probabilities
predicted by the model constitute the unique solution of the system of equations (4). The
maximum-likelihood  estimate thus received is   55. The corresponding disagreement rates
and the associated empirical frequencies are given in Table 6.26 The logit-QRE with  = 55
which gives the best t with the data asserts that disagreement rate should be lower in the high
cost treatment than in the other two. This prediction is borne out by data.
RESULT 6 The best-tting logit-QRE correctly predicts that settlement rate is signicantly
higher in the high cost condition than in the other two. The subgame-perfect equilibrium fails to
predict these empirical comparative statics.
In the logit-QRE the choice probabilities reect rationality in the sense that they are inversely
related to the opportunity costs of the choices and the implied choice probabilities are correctly
anticipated by the opponents. When plaintis tremble in the litigation decisions and costs are
high, the noise has a much more drastic impact on the defendants' incentives in the negotiation
table than it has on the plaintis' incentives: the defendant's expected conict payo falls from
200 to 86 when the plainti shifts from not litigating to litigating, the plainti's expected payo
falls from 10 to 8. Therefore, the defendants should react much more to the introduction of
trembles making them more cautious and willing to avoid impasse. In the low chance condition,
the defendant's expected conict payo is 200 when the plainti does not litigate and 182 if
the plainti does: the defendant's opportunity cost is fairly low and thus logit-QRE predicts
fairly aggressive bargaining behavior by the defendants reected in the high disagreement rate.
Another way to gain insight how opportunity costs inuence the joint incentives of the parties
is to notice that the sum of expected conict payos when the plainti litigates is 96 in the
high cost condition while it is 190 in the other two. The joint opportunity cost is considerably
higher in the high cost condition. Thus logit-QRE predicts that there should be less aggressive
bargaining behavior and less conict in the high cost condition.
Notice that the dierences in disagreement rates between risky and certain courts in the early
rounds are not explained by neither the subgame perfect nor the logit-QRE. To further study
25See Costa-Gomes and Zauner (2001) The coarsening is needed to facilitate the numerical calculation of the
equilibrium choice probabilities and their estimation.
26Regarding litigation, both the perfect Nash equilibrium and the logit-QRE correctly predict that there is
more litigation in the benchmark condition than in the high cost and low chance conditions. The logit-QRE is
the more accurate of the two predicting a 71% (actually 86%) litigation rate in the benchmark condition and a
49% in the other two conditions (actually 60% in the high cost condition and 57% in the low chance condition)
where it is suboptimal to litigate.
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this issue, we run a panel regression analysis. In Table 7 below, a dummy variable indicating
disagreement is regressed on treatment variables controlling for the period of play and allowing
for interactions between treatments and period. The (certain) high cost condition, given its
lowest disagreement rate, is used as the benchline against which the other conditions (LOW,
BENCH, RISK and their interactions) are compared to. Indeed, there is indication that the
high cost condition is less prone to conict than the other two. More detailed analysis shows
that initially it is particularly the risky courts where the plainti has a low chance of winning
(RISKLOW ) which are signicantly more prone to conict. The gap in the settlement rate
between the risky and the certain case narrows down over time as there is more conict in later
periods in the certain case (LOWPeriod) and less in the risky case (RISKLOWPeriod).
Disagreement (1) (2) (3)
RISK -0.0592 0.0548 -0.218
(0.162) (0.206) (0.428)
BENCH 0.658*** 0.766*** 0.487
(0.160) (0.212) (0.541)
(0.307)
RISKBENCH -0.215 0.350
(0.307) (0.771)
Period -0.020 -0.020 -0.0846
(0.0262) (0.0262) (0.0619)
RISKPeriod 0.0663
(0.0893)
BENCHPeriod 0.0673
(0.104)
RISKBENCHPeriod -0.121
(0.150)
LOW 0.459*** 0.537*** -0.467
(0.131) (0.201) (0.441)
RISKLOW -0.157 1.291**
(0.262) (0.611)
LOWPeriod 0.240***
(0.0928)
RISKLOWPeriod -0.347***
(0.133)
Constant -0.406** -0.463*** -0.196
(0.163) (0.174) (0.298)
Observations 1,250 1,250 1,250
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust standard errors in parentheses
Table 7: Disagreement rate regressions, logit
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Given the interesting dierential patterns in the litigation rates when comparing the high
cost condition to the low chance condition (Table 4), we ran specied regressions to analyze
how these litigation patterns are reected in the settlement rate. In Table 8, the disagreement
dummy is regressed in a manner similar to the regression of Table 4. The high cost condition
is compared against the low chance condition including interactions with the riskiness of court
rulings and with experience. Data from the benchmark condition, p = 0:7 and L = 10, are
excluded. The regression reveals interesting patterns: in early rounds risky courts with low
plainti-winning probability are particularly prone to conict (RISK ). Yet, risk has the reverse
impact on disagreement when costs are high (RISKHIGH ). Recall that this latter is exactly
the condition where litigation rates were signicantly higher. Thus the higher settlement rate
seems driven by more cautious bargaining behavior by both sides, each willing to avoid the
implied high litigation costs.
RESULT 7 Risky courts induce more disagreement when the plaintis have low chance of
winning and less disagreement when legal costs are high.
The latter nding is in line with expected utility with risk-aversion and with the experimental
ndings of Ashenfelter et al. (1992) who found that (commonly known) more erratic arbitra-
tion increases the settlement rate. Yet, the rst nding stands in contrast to this prediction.
Ashenfelter et al. (1992) studied eects of forced arbitration if failing to agree. In our setup,
arbitration is costly and an option chosen by the plainti thus leaving room for mistaken be-
liefs about opponent behavior. The result cannot be construed by alternative solution concepts
either.
The signicance of the Period -variable and its interactions suggest dynamic patterns. The
high cost condition becomes more prone to conict over time when risky and less prone to
conict when certain. In the low chance case the dynamic eect of risk is the opposite: less
conict over time with risky, more conict over time with certain court.
RESULT 8 When the plaintis have low chance of winning, there is less conict over time
with risky and more conict over time with certain courts. When legal costs are high, there is
more conict over time with risky and less conict over time with certain courts.
The initial gap in disagreement rates between the risky and certain courts in both the high
cost and the low chance condition narrows down over time.
21
Disagreement
RISK 1.073**
(0.440)
HIGH 0.467
(0.441)
RISKHIGH -1.291**
(0.611)
Period 0.155**
(0.0706)
RISKPeriod -0.280***
(0.0943)
HIGHPeriod -0.240***
(0.0928)
RISKHIGHPeriod 0.347***
(0.133)
Constant -0.663**
(0.334)
Observations 948
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 8: Disagreement rate, "High cost" vs "low chance"
5 Conclusion
We study settlement negotiations and the plainti's decisions to raise a lawsuit after failed
settlement in an incentivized non-framed laboratory experiment.27 In line with subgame-perfect
equilibrium, litigation rates are higher when it is optimal to litigate than when not. Yet, contrary
to the predictions of risk-aversion, we nd that litigation rates are higher when court rulings are
uncertain rather than certain.
There are three explanations to this nding: (i) illusion of control, (ii) loss aversion with
social comparison, (iii) overweighting of small probabilities. We nd evidence favoring the
second explanation: the plainti's expected payo falls short of that of the defendant; the risky
court yet provides with a lottery for narrowing the gap. Our incentivized behavioral results are
in line with the ndings of Loewenstein et al. (1989) in a hypothetical negotiation setting.
Recently an interest has emerged for studying how social comparison inuences risk taking.
The present study diers from other contributions in this emerging literature in that all court
lottery outcomes place the plainti strictly in the disadvantage domain and yet there is variation
in the defendant's payo also. In other studies, the decision maker could end up being ahead
27The sequential interactive task is relatively cognitively demanding. Incentives have been shown to reduce
variance and improve performance in cognitively demanding tasks (Camerer and Hogarth, 1999). Thus the use
of incentives is recommendable in our setting.
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in some outcomes, and behind in some others (Brennan et al. 2008, Bault et al. 2008, for
instance); or the protagonist's payo was held constant whenever the decision maker fell short
of the protagonist's payo in all outcomes (Linde and Sonnemans, 2012). In the present study,
the plainti has a choice between receiving a sure sucker payo or gambling for more equality
at the cost of reducing both player's expected payos. In contrast to the present paper Linde
and Sonnemans (2012) nd evidence for risk aversion in the loss domain. Yet, in none of the
lottery pairs they study a disadvantaged decision maker can choose to generate more expected
equality at a cost for both parties. Our nding gives further support to the conclusion of Linde
and Sonnemans (2012) that the topic deserves further study since simple extensions of either the
prospect theory or inequity aversion models fail to capture many stable patterns in behavior.
Notice that in a contextually richer framework, a higher litigation rate under variant decrees
could be driven by willingness to delegate the moral judgement to the impartial court. Such
"shifting the blame"-argument has been suggested in a general context by Bartling and Fish-
bacher (2011) and it might be particularly important in the legal context where the court is
perceived to have a moral authority. Yet in our non-framed laboratory study the eect should
be smaller.
When it comes to the negotiation strategies, impasses are frequent in the initial rounds
particularly when courts are risky and the plainti has scant chances of winning. The negotiation
conict seems to be driven by the lower opportunity cost of conict for the defendants which
makes them more aggressive in the low chance condition. An intriguing nding is that in the
high cost condition where the sum of opportunity costs is high, the settlement rate is much
higher than in the other two. Keeping check of private incentives to litigate can be achieved in
two alternative ways, either by raising the costs of going to court or by lowering the chances
of winning the case. Our study illustrates how psychological factors and error imply that the
two are not perfect substitutes in reducing litigation or increasing settlement rate. The fact
that the plaintis err in their litigation choices implies that the defendants must be particularly
cautious in the settlement stage when legal costs are high. Lowering the odds of winning for
the plaintis have the opposite incentive eect: the defendants' opportunity cost of settlement
is lower and thus they are considerably less cautious in the negotiation table. Thus higher legal
costs imply considerably higher settlement rate. Yet one should note that when risk-spread in
court rulings increases, the plaintis tend to be more willing litigate, though less demanding
in the bargaining table. Thus the introduction of risk might have a surprising impact on the
balance of agreements outside the court and thus cause an unexpected distributional eect.
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